Lawyers have traditionally viewed law as a closed system, and doctrinal research has been the research methodology used most widely in the profession. This reflects traditional concepts of legal reasoning. There is a wealth of reliable and valid social science data available to lawyers and judges. Judges in fact often refer to general facts about the world, society, institutions and human behaviour ('empirical facts'). Legal education needs to prepare our students for this broader legal context. This paper examines how 'empirical facts' are used in Australian and other common law courts.
INTRODUCTION
There is a vast array of valid social science research available to the modern lawyer.
Research of current Australian, United States and United Kingdom judicial decisions demonstrates judges do refer to empirical facts and sometimes refer to social science research as part of judicial reasoning.
1 In this article we define empirical facts as 'general facts about the world, society, institutions and human behaviour'. Traditionally lawyers have been trained within a 'doctrinal' research methodology framework. There are existing rules of evidence in all jurisdictions allowing for a formal use of empirical data within the doctrinal framework. 2 However these existing rules of evidence do not appear to adequately cater for the wide variety of ways in which empirical facts are utilised in judicial decisions. 3 Increasingly, empirical fact assumptions and sometimes social science material is being subsumed within judgments. The way this material finds its way into judges' decisions appears to primarily rest upon judicial discretion. 4 Social science material relevant to empirical fact assumptions is not always (or even often) adequately acknowledged by judges. 5 The recognition of the judicial use of empirical facts as part of Report 102, 2005, 17.3-17.27 in relation to judicial notice and the operation of s 144 of the Evidence Acts. The Commission recommended against any change to the legislation in relation to judicial notice to reflect the use of 'social facts ' [17.27] . There have been no changes either to Australian evidence law or practice in recent years that respond to the judicial use of empirical facts, or attempts to better equip judges to make reliable findings about empirical facts. 4 Ibid.
doctrinal methodologies. In this article we will consider how judges use empirical facts in their judicial decisions and the implications of this for traditional concepts of legal research and legal research training. In Part I of the article we will define the concept of 'empirical facts' and briefly discuss how judges utilise empirical facts in their judgments.
In Part II we will discuss the implications of this judicial use of empirical facts for traditional models of legal research. In Part III we will discuss how legal research training in the future should respond to the use of empirical facts in judicial decisionmaking. This article will argue that traditional models of legal research, and traditional doctrinal approaches to legal research training, fail to respond to the use of empirical facts by judges. New approaches must be considered.
I DEFINING EMPIRICAL FACTS AND JUDICIAL USE OF EMPIRICAL FACTS
Various commentators have attempted to categorise the facts judges use in their judicial reasoning. In 1942, Kenneth Culp Davis argued that there were two types of facts used by judges -'legislative facts' and 'adjudicative facts'. 6 Adjudicative facts are 'case-specific facts', including instances where social science research is submitted as evidence regarding a matter of specific contention between the parties. 7 Adjudicative facts are not included within the definition of empirical facts in this article. Adjudicative facts are facts found by judges as part of litigation. They tend to be limited to the litigants in the specific dispute and are normally subject to the usual rules of evidence.
Where a 'court or an agency develops law or policy it is acting legislatively' and Kenneth the law in isolation. Legal researchers have adopted an 'internal approach' and have analysed the legal rules and principles 'taking the perspective of an insider in the system'. 40 The sources of law have been the primary materials, the doctrine of the law -the case law and legislation.
The research carried out has largely been confined to an analysis of legal doctrine. Thus doctrinal research is the established traditional territory of the lawyer-researcher. As a result, where legal research has been taught in the law schools the methodology taught has been doctrinal research. In some cases doctrinal legal research has not even been taught explicitly.
Law schools have relied on the 'osmosis effect' for research training. We can define doctrinal research as -'Research which provides a systematic exposition of the rules governing a particular legal category, analyses the relationship between rules, explains areas of difficulty and, perhaps, predicts future developments.'
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What is evident from this study on the use of empirical facts in the courts is that lawyers need to look at the law from a much broader angle than has been done previously. This is a quite concrete example of how the law does not work within a vacuum. Therefore, as researchers, lawyers need to be totally cognisant of the parameters of empirically-based knowledge and research methodologies. and social science models, needs to be part of the graduating lawyers' research skills and attributes. Fundamental research encourages an interdisciplinary perspective and use of methodologies borrowed from the social sciences to study the law in operation. It expands legal research from a purely doctrinal isolated 'box' and encourages a broader view of the way law is actually working in society.
B The History of the Use of Empirical Methodologies in Law
There is a growing empirical law movement in the United States at present. Empirical work and the interface of law and social science is a continuing tradition in the United
States, dating back to the Realist movement in the 1930s and 1940s. 45 That movement was keen to highlight the differences between 'law on the books' and 'law in action'.
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These issues were taken up by the law and society movements in the 1960s. As Tracey It is timely to consider how we as legal educators might inculcate these skills in our graduates -and especially in our academic track higher degree research students. At present, greater use is being made by legal scholars of empirical methods. Academics need to ensure that the methods they are using results in 'good' empirical research.
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They need to ensure that the standards are high. There is an onus on legal academics to lead by example -to demonstrate academic leadership by joining interdisciplinary groups and demonstrating an openness to learning and working with empirical methodologies.
C A Review of Legal Research Methodologies
Over the past decade there has been recognition that the law cannot be confined to a 'black letter' box. There has also been a move towards some relatively 'safe' research methods extensions including research into the philosophy underlying legal rules (theoretical research), research into the reform of legal rules (law reform research), and research into the policy behind legal rules (policy research). This discovery of the impact and use of empirical data in the courts is further evidence of the need to educate future lawyers (and academics) in broader research methodologies.
D Advantages and Disadvantages of using Non-doctrinal Research Methods
Speaking in the 1970s, William Twining pointed out that the central weakness of the expository tradition, 'is that typically it takes as its starting point and its main focus of attention rules of law, without systematic or regular reference to the context of problems they are supposed to resolve, the purposes they were intended to serve or the effects they 88 M. A Hall and R.F. Wright, supra n. 37; Burns (2004), supra n. 1; Mullane, supra n. is completed and the reports written, there can be uncertainty in regard to where to publish -whether in a legal journal or an interdisciplinary one. The method and citation style for writing up the research will be different for each. The level and depth of analysis will be different. In all, therefore, using non-doctrinal methodologies equates to less control over the process and outcomes than doctrinal work.
III IMPLICATIONS FOR LEGAL RESEARCH TRAINING
It is now more than ever important to acknowledge that empirical research methodologies are relevant to the practice and research of law in the 21 st century. As Jeremy Webber commented in 2004, 104 'Legal sociologists should seek ways of incorporating practitioners' deliberation into their analyses … And those making legal arguments -professionals, judges and academics alike -should similarly reflect on how the two modes of explanation intersect. This may mean exploring how sociological studies might contribute to the construction of legal argument. … the law schools' role extends to the systematic investigation of law's effects, consideration of law's function in society, and reflection on law's nature and foundational principles. Those are essential tasks of law schools. … And the more we know about the empirical effectiveness of the law, the better our students will be able to advise their clients on courses of conduct that are reasonable, not chimerical.'
Research training must include a broader non-doctrinal methodology component. There is a wealth of general social data that is used to some extent by the legislature but that also impinges on legal decision-making. There is a need to introduce students to the existence and nature of interdisciplinary research -the extensive work of anthropologists, sociologists, criminologists, economists and sociologists that impinge on the law. Law schools need to introduce a wider range of research methodologies into their research training particularly those based in the social sciences. Students must be aware of the basic principles of social investigation, where to source publicly available information, and how to critique empirical research from the perspective of validity and reliability.
They must be able to distinguish valid empirical research from anecdotal evidence. This means that empirical methodologies must be introduced into the law curriculum so that law students can deal with empirical facts in a knowledgeable fashion.
In doing this, legal academics have a role in ensuring that students are aware that there are various components in the judicial reasoning process -including the evidence and legal principle, but also facts based in the judge's views and information based in the social sciences. Legal reasoning is more than simply applying law to the adjudicative facts. Other facts form part of the context.
A What are the Existing Opportunities for Lawyers to be Trained in Empirical Methodologies
A number of Australian law faculties conducted curriculum reviews during 2007 and 2008, so there is constant flux in the degree offerings nationally. Legal education has embraced skills in the last decade under the rubric of graduate attributes. 105 However, each Australian law school curriculum must include the subject areas identified by the Priestley Committee in 1992. 106 There are strong views from many legal educators that the Priestley 11, which is skewed towards substantive rather than skills-based instruction, is 'a significant constraint on re-formulating Australian legal education in ways that are modern and relevant'. 107 However the answer to this issue is not simply to take substantive material out of the degree and replace it with additional methodologies training. This is more a matter of practical exposure and appropriate treatment of empirical methodologies and evidence within the degree. There is more opportunity for students to achieve a depth of knowledge within the later Postgraduate students need exposure to the range of research methodologies possible for their projects. This requires an introduction to methodologies to augment the doctrinal work with which they are familiar. Some students might embark on extensive empirical methodologies. Others may consider a simple survey. Postgraduates therefore also need information on the process of requesting ethics approval from the relevant university committees.
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To effectively introduce empirical facts recognition and awareness the material has to be introduced as part of assessment in units. This is more difficult to accomplish. One reason is that even for those units where students are at liberty to choose their own topics and their own research methods, there are time limitations involved. In Australian universities, there are often only 13 weeks in a semester. Even providing the students have their topic clearly defined at the beginning of the semester, there is still a lagtime required for the ethics approval procedure and a simple survey can take time to set up.
For this reason students may be dissuaded from doing more than a doctrinal study within the timeframe. Only those who are engaged in longer projects can organise their work sufficiently to undertake a more extensive research program. Even then, they may encounter difficulties finding a suitable supervisor within the law faculty. Small numbers of postgraduate law students are taking up the challenge of empirical non-doctrinal studies because of the obstacles being encountered. Where then will future researchers gain the training required to apply for large research grants and undertake meaningful research?
Central to this discussion is the cost of teaching research to large student bodies. In the current context in Australia, the overall numbers of students entering law schools have increased dramatically. Legal research requires academics with specific expertise. It is time consuming to teach. The levels of marking tend to be higher than a normal substantive unit. In this context, it would seem that the ability to include additional nondoctrinal research training is less likely without a positive recognition of need.
However, given a commitment by the universities and government to the need for change, advances are possible. The UK Nuffield Report recommended a system of bursaries, grants and fellowships to encourage academic training in empirical research skills from undergraduate to post-doctoral level.
124 These included academics being awarded bursaries 'for the preparation of course materials and modules that would support undergraduate, post-graduate and mid-career training in empirical legal research skills'. 125 There were also recommendations that the universities and law schools 'should consider enhancing the undergraduate curriculum by offering an option on law in society, or offering options with a significant empirical content' (for example family law, dispute resolution, some aspects of public law). that the problem is 'a structural one which reflects the relatively weak position of sociolegal researchers and, in particular of those who conduct empirical research in law schools, and the absence of any real incentives that would encourage law schools to take postgraduate training in socio-legal studies seriously. 128 The situation in Australian law schools is by and large similar.
IV IN CONCLUSION
This article argues that empirical facts are an established part of the judicial reasoning process. However, lawyers have not been trained sufficiently well to deal with this information or to use it effectively. In addition, the evidential rules and legal process are not sufficiently open to the effective use of this data in the courts. It is time that we as lawyers recognise all the aspects of the process necessary to deal with the modern factual context. Having done so, this will have quite far-ranging effects on the way law and indeed legal reasoning is taught.
Traditional doctrinal models of legal research need to be supplemented by methodologies based on an awareness of the methods used in other disciplines particularly social research methods. This is already happening to some extent, especially within research work being carried out by law academics as part of competitive research grants, as part of interdisciplinary research teams, and by higher degree research students particularly PhD students. However, we need to begin training students from the undergraduate level effectively in the critical use of these methods.
New models of legal education and law curricula need to incorporate empirical material and empirical methodologies. New curriculums being developed in the law schools need to recognise the changes occurring within society and research based social data being made available. This means that we should have not only basic empirical training incorporated within the various research skills units in the degree, more extensive elective offerings available, empirical experts available as supervisors and advisors for higher degree research students, but a recognition of the importance of empirical facts in legal reasoning within the substantive courses. This latter aspect is less achievable in some ways than the former because of the limited expertise demonstrated by substantive lawyers in recognising the importance of the use of this information in legal reasoning and even within the judicial process itself. However, small steps can be taken when there is some commitment.
Law is not a closed system. It is intrinsically embedded in its specific legal context and community. The availability of empirical facts and the implicit use of this data is an indicator that we as lawyers need to change. Legal education naturally follows practice.
Despite what is said about the law being a closed system, the examples of the use of empirical facts in this article demonstrate that law is being pressured to recognise the existence of the work of other disciplines and its relevance to decision making in the courts, and therefore legal educators need to better equip the profession to deal with the contextual research that they encounter.
Empirical methodologies give lawyers an opportunity to use forward planning by being cognizant of the context for change and the possibilities for constant evaluation of the way law is working in society in order to improve its effectiveness. At this point we need to better inform our profession -our judges, our law students, and academics on the wealth of data available to them and to encourage and to make provision for the proficient use of this data in the legal process.
